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Highlights: 
 
- Accuracy of true and fake news consistent with own political attitudes is 
overrated 
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- Analytical thinking and susceptibility to falling for fake news are negatively 
related 
- Deliberation reduces susceptibility to falling for fake news 
- News consumption habits should be investigated in future studies 
- External validity of fake news tests need to be considered 
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Abstract: 
This review discusses recent findings on individuals’ susceptibility to falling for fake 
news in the political context. Considering political attitudes and analytical thinking, 
we find that individuals tend to overrate the accuracy of true and fake political news 
that are consistent with their own political attitudes. This tendency, however, cannot 
be explained by motivated reasoning. This is supported by findings showing that 
analytical thinking is negatively related to susceptibility to falling for fake news, 
regardless of whether they are consistent or inconsistent with one’s political 
attitudes. 
We suggest that future works should aim at i) examining how, for example, news 
consumption habits relate to susceptibility to falling for fake news and ii) 
implementing other, more external valid fake news tests. 
 
Keywords: Fake News, Disinformation, Susceptibility, Analytical Thinking, Political 
Attitudes 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fake news is a widely known catchphrase, appearing in the media almost every day 
in recent times. Despite the popularity of the phrase, however, a consensus on its 
exact definition is lacking [1–5]. The widespread use of the term, also for example in 
politics, makes it difficult to specify a precise definition for the concept. A review of 
various definitions of fake news, misinformation, disinformation, and similarly related 
terms, and a discussion on their common characteristics, is beyond the scope of the 
present review. Instead, in the present review we will utilize a recent definition of 
fake news as genre. This definition includes three criteria that need to be fulfilled to 
categorize information as fake news: low facticity, creation with the intention to 
deceive, and a journalistic format [6].  
A large amount of research has been conducted on the general topic of fake 
news in recent years: searching for the term “fake news” on google scholar leads to 
around 18,900 results published between 2010 and 2020 (2020.02.13). Broadly 
speaking, the topics of interest are among others the detection [7] and spread of fake 
news [8], understanding why people spread fake news [9], and helping people avoid 
falling for fake news [10,11]1. 
For the purpose of this review, we suggest that fake news would not be such 
an important topic, if individuals were able to correctly identify fake news, and thus 
correctly discern true from fake news. If individuals were able to do this, they would 
be able to form their beliefs and opinions based on true facts and events, despite the 
existence of fake news. Research shows, however, that there are individual 
differences in beliefs about the accuracy of (certain) fake news, dependent on a 
range of circumstances. We therefore regard it as particularly important to review the 
crucial question: “Who falls for fake news?”. Developing an answer to this question 
necessitates addressing the key risk and resilience factors for susceptibility to falling 
for fake news. On that note, despite environmental factors (e.g. warnings, source 
credibility) also playing an important role in understanding susceptibility to falling for 
fake news, this review will mainly focus on individual characteristics. 
The other important point to note is that fake news can be seen as a highly 
politicized topic. This is due to the fact that fake news often covers political topics, 
either supporting or denouncing particular political opinions. As such, fake news is 
likely to be used in the course of political campaigns and can influence voting 
decisions [12] (please also see works on politically oriented news and polarization 
[13,14]). A prominent example of this is the discussion on the spread of fake news 
during the US presidential elections in 2016, which may, or may not, have influenced 
the election results [1,15,16]. Against this background, we decided to focus this 
review on the associations between political attitudes, cognitions likely associated 
with these attitudes, and susceptibility to falling for fake news. 
 
 
2. Review: Who falls for fake news? 
 
2.1 Political attitudes 
According to classic cognitive dissonance theory, (cognitive) inconsistencies 
are deemed uncomfortable [17]. Based on this theory, individuals might tend to rate 
                                                 
1 Please note that these studies use different definitions and operationalizations of fake / false news, 
disinformation, and misinformation; the cited studies should be seen as examples. 
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news items which include content that opposes their political attitudes as fake news, 
to reduce or prevent potential dissonance. Moreover, based on coherent accounts of 
thought, one can assume that information which is coherent with one’s knowledge 
and beliefs is processed more fluently, and is therefore perceived more positively 
[18]. In the context of the news, this might indicate that news content which fits with 
one’s political attitudes is processed more fluently and, therefore, perceived as more 
accurate. Similarly, some authors argue that individuals are likely to decide on the 
perceived accuracy of information, i.e. news, based on their existing values or 
partisanship [19,20]. Taken together, this indicates that individuals tend to overrate 
the accuracy of news items which are consistent with their political attitudes, 
whereas they underrate the accuracy of news items which are inconsistent with their 
political attitudes. 
Empirical work on this topic mostly operationalizes political attitudes as the 
participant’s opinion on Hillary Clinton versus Donald Trump. For example, one study 
investigating fake news among others found that the more individuals were pro 
Trump/Republican, the more they rated fake news headlines with negative content 
about Hillary Clinton as accurate. The more pro Clinton/Democrat participants were, 
the more they rated fake news headlines with negative content about Donald Trump 
as accurate [21]. Results of other studies reporting effects on the perceived accuracy 
of true and fake news headlines support the notion that individuals tend to overrate 
the accuracy of all news items that fit more closely with their political beliefs and 
attitudes compared to non-fitting news items [1,22]. In one particular study, this effect 
was found both before and after a period of deliberation time [22]. However most 
importantly, it was also found in this study that after time to deliberate, participants 
tended to correct their response as compared to a quicker response. This correction 
was independent of whether the content of the news headline was consistent or not 
with their political attitudes [22]. This contradicts the notion of motivated, perhaps 
even conscious, reasoning in the judgment of news headlines based on one’s 
political attitudes; because if this were the case, more time to consider information 
(i.e, news) would lead to more overrating of the accuracy of news items that were 
consistent with one’s political attitudes. At the same time, it would lead to more 
underrating of the accuracy of news items that were inconsistent with one's political 
attitudes.  
In line with these findings on deliberation, results from a further study and two 
large samples indicate that individuals may be particularly good at discerning 
between true and true fake news headlines (average rating of accuracy of true minus 
average rating of accuracy of fake news headlines) for items which fit with their 
political attitudes. In addition, analytical thinking (see further discussion in paragraph 
2.2) was negatively related to the perceived accuracy of fake news headlines, 
regardless of whether they were consistent or not with one's own political attitudes. 
Again, this argues against motivated reasoning in the judgment of the accuracy of 
news items [3]. 
 In conclusion, the recent literature suggests that political attitudes alone do 
not explain whether or not people fall for fake news. There might be a general 
tendency to overrate the accuracy of news items which are consistent with one’s 
political attitudes. However, there is limited evidence that individuals use motivated 
reasoning to intentionally discredit news items that are inconsistent with their own 
attitudes. The same might also be true for overrating the accuracy of news items 
which are consistent with one’s political attitudes. Instead, deliberation and analytical 
thinking seem to positively influence the ability to detect fake news. 
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2.2 Cognition 
Therefore, the next factor we review here is analytical thinking, which is often 
operationalized in the study of fake news using a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). In 
CRTs, (mathematical) problems must be solved, in which the intuitive answer is 
incorrect [23,24]2. CRTs therefore measure the extent to which individuals engage in 
analytical versus intuitive thinking. While analytical thinking is controlled and 
conscious, intuitive thinking reflects an automatic and unconscious style of thinking 
[25,26]. As mentioned above, if motivated reasoning was important in explaining the 
susceptibility to falling for fake news, analytical thinking as well as deliberation 
should be positively related to falling for fake news in line with one’s political 
attitudes. This does not, however, seem to be the case (please see discussion in 
paragraph 2.1).  
More specifically, analytical thinking has been negatively associated with the 
perceived accuracy of fake news headlines in several studies and across a number 
of different samples [3,22,27,28]. Importantly, whereas analytical thinking seems to 
be only slightly positively related to the perceived accuracy of true news, it has 
repeatedly been positively associated with discernment of true and fake news 
[3,22,27,28]. Hence, thinking analytically, rather than relying on intuition, seems to 
be a resilience factor against falling for fake news regardless of consistency with 
one’s political attitudes. Analytical thinking, however, does not seem to be 
associated with an overall skepticism towards news. 
It has also been found that analytical thinking, as measured with the CRT, 
was negatively related to the perceived accuracy of implausible news headlines, but 
positively related to the perceived accuracy of plausible news headlines [3]. In one of 
the studies mentioned above, fake news headlines were also rated as more 
implausible compared to true news headlines. This might therefore explain the 
negative associations found between analytical thinking and perceived accuracy of 
fake news headlines [3]. However, it raises the question about what would happen if 
fake news items were highly plausible: Would individuals who think more analytically 
tend to believe such fake news items more than individuals who do not think very 
analytically?  
 Consistent with the findings on the CRT, deliberation also seems to be an 
important factor protecting people against falling for fake news. It has been found 
that deliberation reduces the (false) accuracy rating of fake news headlines. 
Specifically, participants responded more correctly (i.e., the perceived accuracy of 
fake news was lower) after deliberation, compared to a quicker response which was 
given under time pressure and alongside participating in a load task [22]. As already 
mentioned above, this was true for fake news regardless of consistency with one's 
own political attitudes. 
Summing up the findings regarding analytical thinking and deliberation reveals 
that both are negatively related to the perceived accuracy of fake news headlines, 
potentially via the implausibility of fake news headlines in the studies.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Please note that a thorough discussion on the use of the CRT as measure of analytical thinking is 
beyond the scope of this review. Instead, we mention the operationalizations used by the authors of the 
original studies. 
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3. Conclusions, Outlook and Future Research 
 
This short review has provided an overview of the recent literature on susceptibility 
to falling for fake news in political contexts, with a focus on personal characteristics. 
Overall there appears to be a bias towards overrating the accuracy of true and fake 
news which are consistent with one’s preexisting political attitudes. However, the 
literature also suggests that rather than motivated reasoning leading to an overrating 
of news consistent with one's attitudes and underrating of news inconsistent with 
one's attitudes, analytical thinking and deliberation improve the discernment between 
true and fake news, and reduce susceptibility to falling for fake news. This overview 
suggests that also in everyday life, individuals should more deliberately and 
analytically think about news items they are confronted with.  
Moreover, we deem it important to also consume more different news 
sources. By viewing various news sources, one is able to compare information 
derived from different sources and, potentially, better detect fake news, and, hence, 
not fall for it. Of course, this does not help if all news sources consumed are 
unreliable, or support the same political attitudes via being part of an “echo chamber” 
or “filter bubble” [29,30]. This emphasizes the importance of traditional, offline news 
media outlets in today’s digital society, in contrast to social media. In contrast to 
traditional media, on social media news can be spread by both professional and non-
professional sources without fact checking (at least in the first instance). A potentially 
novel and important line of research that follows from this would be examining the 
associations between news consumption and susceptibility to falling for fake news. 
Moreover, it seems somewhat surprising that in the existing literature on 
susceptibility to falling for fake news, both classic personality traits, such as the Five 
Factor Model, and intelligence measures have not yet been investigated. For 
example, one might expect that conscientiousness and openness to experience 
would act as buffers against falling for fake news. These personality traits have been 
associated with consuming news offline (versus via social media only; 
conscientiousness), and consuming a higher number of news sources (openness to 
experience) [31]. Moreover, higher intelligence, both fluid and crystallized, should 
also be negatively related to falling for fake news. For example, fluid intelligence 
might positively influence the detection of implausible information in fake news.  
  Next, it should be noted that all of the studies reviewed above explicitly asked 
for the perceived accuracy of fake (and true) news headlines before the participants 
saw the news items. On that basis, the external validity of these fake news tests is 
somewhat questionable. In everyday life, individuals potentially do not think too 
deeply about the accuracy of all news headlines, for example those which are 
presented to them via social media. As fake news is very much a “real world” 
problem, it is important for future studies to create experimental settings that are 
more realistic and that will allow us to draw conclusions that are more valid in 
everyday contexts.  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that more constructs potentially related to fake 
news need to be explored in future research. For example, according to Schwarz, 
Newman, and Leach [32], five key criteria are used by individuals when judging on 
the accuracy of information: Acceptance by others, amount of supporting evidence, 
compatibility with one’s beliefs, general coherence of the information, and credibility 
of the source. A study from Germany found that trust in traditional news media and 
the political system both negatively related to susceptibility to falling for fake news 
[12]. In line with the findings discussed earlier on analytical thinking, the construct of 
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need for cognition might be negatively related to the perceived accuracy of fake 
news (but see Pennycook and Rand [28] for a discussion on this topic). Additionally, 
it might be interesting to investigate the role of emotions in susceptibility to falling for 
fake news [33,34]. Lastly, while the prior exposure effect [35] was not discussed in 
this review due to the focus on individual characteristics, it is, nevertheless, of critical 
importance in understanding susceptibility to falling for fake news, particularly in 
conjunction with cognitive abilities.  
In conclusion, an integration of the aforementioned variables to help explain 
more variance in susceptibility to fake news, as well as the use of more realistic 
experimental settings in empirical studies, would be of tremendous importance in 
future work in this area. 
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